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Oscar Wilde’s concerns with ethics and morals seldom dominate discussions around his 
work, which often focus on his role as a leading English aesthete and on his remarkable 
appetence for witticism. Such concerns, however, permeate his oeuvre quite extensively and 
offer a new perspective through which his critical theory might be perceived. The equilibrium 
achieved between Wilde’s most flagrante remarks about literary criticism and his underlying 
belief that art could add something to life and society have secured him a distinct place in 
the history of world literature that should not be overlooked.   
Aestheticism – Ethics – Morals – Oscar Wilde 
Resumo 
 
Considerações sobre ética ou moral raramente dominam a discussão em torno da obra de 
Oscar Wilde, cujo foco tende primariamente para o seu papel enquanto figura basilar do 
esteticismo inglês. Contudo, tais conceitos permeiam amplamente a sua obra e oferecem uma 
nova perspectiva através da qual o seu legado crítico pode ser entendido. O equilíbrio 
atingido entre as suas observações mais surpreendentes sobre crítica literária e a sua 
convicção, ainda que subtil, de que a arte pode acrescentar alguma coisa de importante tanto 
à sociedade como à vida em geral asseguram-lhe um lugar destacado na história da literatura 
mundial que não deve ser desconsiderado.  
















When describing his first encounter with Oscar Wilde in November 1891, André Gide refers 
to him in a letter to Paul Valéry as an admirable aesthete who "avait su créer, par devant son 
vrai personnage, un amusant fantôme dont il jouait avec esprit" (Wilde, 2000, p. 496). In this 
brief yet poignant remark, Gide succeeded in outlining what would be one of Wilde’s most 
singular aspects, one that can be found not just in his manner as an individual, but in his 
entire body of work – his artificiality.  
As regards his life and work, Wilde remains until this day an intriguing individual, one 
endowed with a striking wit and a no doubt peculiar tendency to paradox, which have granted 
him a singular status in the history of world literature. Many times, when writing about him, 
we risk falling into the habit of taking his words at face value, treating them as a mere play 
of opposites, with no ulterior signification or motive other than an aesthetic, teasing, and 
controversial statement aimed at a conservative, moralist society. 
In doing so, however, we are but scratching the surface of what these words – “Mere words!” 
(Wilde, 2008, p. 19) – actually entail. If looked upon closely enough, these sentences which 
we now so prolifically print on fridge magnets or share across social media, serve as an 
entryway into what Julia Brown deems “Wilde’s most important, [yet] most elusive legacy, 
his philosophy of art” (Brown, 1997, p. xvii). 
Accepting him as this artificially created fantôme will prove paramount in our understanding 
of Wilde, in that this description shall serve as the main light source against which we shall 
examine his radiograph. Although Wilde can undoubtedly be associated with the French-
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born aesthetic movement, this will prove many times a loose-fitting garment, preventing us 
from grasping the complexity of his silhouette as an artist and theoretician. Indeed, Wilde 
spent the larger part of his career trying to secure a separate space for his art, one in which 
he deals not with truth as we commonly know it, but with a Wildean truth, resting on and 
supported by the very paradigm it creates. A concern with truth (in whichever sense we take 
it) will, as it is, permeate many of his arguments on life and art, and bring Wilde into close 
contact with philosophers the likes of Kant and Nietzsche.  
One of the greatest obstacles faced by those who dedicate themselves to studying Oscar 
Wilde’s work has to do with his characteristic ambiguity. Even relatively consensual aspects, 
such as his inclusion in an aesthetic school of thought, inherited from French thinkers of the 
fin de siècle, bring about questions that should be addressed when referring to the Irish-born 
writer and critic.  
If Wilde’s ambiguity and tendency to paradox sometimes render his ideas on art and life far 
from clear or consistent (Quintus, 1980, p. 572), something that we can be certain of is that 
both concepts permeate his oeuvre and that they are oftentimes counterposed. This conflict 
stems directly from the very own concerns of the aesthetic movement itself, as it was 
conceived by Kant and, later, Pater, for example, or of its later stage, the 19th century 
decadent period.  
In Wilde’s work, the originating conflict can well be described as a disagreement between 
ethics and aesthetics, in the sense that Wilde regards aestheticism and Art as the ultimate 
expressions of individual freedom while ethics acts as a constant reminder that we are not 
entirely free but subject to the ruling morals and laws. 
One of the most notorious Wildean characteristics has to do with this point exactly – his 
attack on the type of thinking involved in these limiting ethical judgements. At a first glance, 
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it may seem that aesthetics are his sole concern and that moral is relegated to a secondary 
plan to which Wilde only refers whenever he wishes to object to it. Morals, however, play a 
crucial role in his aesthetic theory, as I hope to be able to prove henceforth. 
One could even say that the very central problem Wilde faces in his defence of an aesthetic 
theory of art is similar to that which Dorian Gray will find in Wilde’s only novel and by far 
his most famous work – The Picture of Dorian Gray – where he seems to put the validity of his 
arguments to test. 
The main character of the novel, Dorian, follows a profoundly aesthetic code of conduct, 
aiming to transform his own life in a work of art, as suggested not only by Lord Henry’s 
theorisations of a New Hedonism, but also by Dorian’s reading a particularly “poisonous” 
novel, which Wilde later identifies as the decadent French masterpiece A Rebours by Joris-
Karl Huysmans1. Ironically, this very novel was lent to Dorian by no other than Lord Henry 
himself, which will doubly establish his figure as one whose impact is decisive on Dorian’s 
fate. 
Lord Henry’s “New Hedonism” is in deep conflict with the ruling society values and Dorian 
will end up falling victim to this very conflict, not being able to find his place in between 
these polar opposites. 
Similarly, Oscar Wilde will come to face a no less tragic fate than his most famous character’s, 
as he will be convicted of and ultimately imprisoned for “gross indecency” – a direct 
consequence of his not conforming to the ruling traditional morals. Wilde himself seems 
 
1 In a letter to E. W. Pratt, a presumed admirer, Wilde says that “the book in Dorian Gray is one of the 
many books I have never written, but it is partly suggested by Huysman’s A Rebours” (Wilde, 2000, p. 524) 
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very much aware that pursuing his objective of turning his life into a work of art and 
dedicating it to defending aestheticism as a cause and remedy for the evils of society will 
prove incompatible with not just society but also the law. For this reason, he was condemned 
to be seen as a dissident. 
In a long letter sent to Lord Alfred Douglas after his imprisonment in Reading Prison, known 
as De Profundis, Wilde will admit that “I was so typically a child of my age that in my perversity, 
and for that perversity’s sake, I turned the good things of my life to evil, and the evil things 
of my life to good” (Wilde, 2002, p. 60). In the very same letter, he will account for the 
apparent paradox his beliefs have led him to, saying that 
“[to] be entirely free, and at the same time dominated by law, is the eternal 
paradox of human life that we realize at every moment.” (Wilde, 2002, p. 
28)  
In conclusion, Wilde lets us in on his dilemma between an aesthetic code which he most 
avidly advocated for and a moral one that he has tried to set himself apart from. Wilde’s path 
to maturity – achieved in De Profundis – is one of constant re-evaluation and readaptation of 
the arguments of his youth, without ever abandoning them completely. In the letter, Wilde 
lets Bosie know that he has finally found the humility he had until then missed – a humility 
that resides exactly in a rediscovered temperance in the most tortuous period of his life. 
Wilde’s reassessment of some of his previous statements, starting at a point where the sphere 
of art seems as distant from morals as possible and ultimately culminating in his will to write 
about “The Artistic life considered in its relation to Conduct” (Wilde, 2002, p. 80) makes his 
work entirely innovating and intriguing. It is interesting to see how his moral concerns had 
always been part of his theories on art. As Julia Brown cleverly points out: 
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Wilde was never a serious proponent of what [Walter] Benjamin calls the 
“negative theology of art” (as is, for example, Mallarmé), which totally 
denies any social function of art. (…) Wilde was too much a student of 
Ruskin to exclude social context from his theory of art’s place and power. 
For l’art pour l’art, writes Benjamin, “was scarcely ever to be taken 
literally” (Brown, 1997, p. 75). 
Surely, Wilde has claimed to utterly reject morals many times, but he has never gone so far 
as to be able to abandon them completely. Morals were a constant concern of Wilde’s. 
Also Stanley Weintraub notices that “‘Art for art’s sake’ may have been a splendid 
contemporary watchword, but Wilde expected art to provide some revelation of human life. 
Now and then the mask slipped.” (Quintus, 1980, p. 559)  These slips happen exactly when 
Wilde lets his effective concern with morals and ethics shine through, oftentimes disagreeing 
with arguments he himself had given in previous instances. This is what Julia Brown calls 
Wilde’s “reassociation of sensibility” - being able to overcome the contrast between ethics 
and aesthetics, not through means of synthesis, but instead by demonstrating that the two 
are, in fact, not just correlated but interdependent (Brown, 1997, p. 51). 
This correlation will see its maximum representation in “The Soul of Man Under Socialism”, 
in which Wilde will build upon his previously stated ideas and elevate them into a political 
pseudo-manifesto. 
The way in which I aim to present these Wildean concerns will be organised, fundamentally, 
in three different chapters: primarily, I will try to give a precise account of Wilde’s aesthetic 
theory as it is presented in his foundational essays “The Decay of Lying” and “The Critic as 
Artist”; secondly, I hope to be able to demonstrate how a moral dimension is introduced in 
both these essays and, additionally, in The Picture of Dorian Gray; finally, I will try to bring 
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together these two aspects – aesthetics and ethics – by discussing Wilde’s pseudo-political 







In what might be considered his most ambiguous and controversial work, “The Decay of 
Lying”, Wilde introduces some of his most famous and counterintuitive arguments on how 
life and art are related, namely his thesis that “life imitates art far more than art imitates life” 
(Wilde, 2002, p. 171). 
The essay takes the shape of a dialogue, possibly inherited from Plato, to whom several 
references are made, however veiled they may seem. However, Wilde’s dialogue will not 
follow the exact same structure of Plato’s, being much more of an expository kind. 
Nevertheless, by its means, “the thinker (…) can both reveal and conceal himself” (Wilde, 
2002, p. 226), a possibility much appreciated by Wilde. By choosing to “conceal himself” 
under the guise of one of his characters, the author is somewhat free to “reveal” his 
arguments. After all, “man is least himself when he talks in his own person. Give him a mask, 
and he will tell you the truth” (Wilde, 2002, p. 225).  This decision lets us in on Wilde’s 
personality as he can be seen practically boasting about his inflammatory theory. 
Throughout the essay, Wilde’s character Vivian will take a firm stand lamenting the fact that 
the art of lying is becoming extinct. From a moral standpoint, one could even think that this 
was for the better, as truth telling is, actually, an admirable virtue both in nowadays’ and 
Wilde’s society. Wilde, however, is not so much concerned with truth as we commonly 
perceive it – as accuracy – but rather with the way truth has been slowly penetrating the 
realm of art, in which, according to Vivian, it most definitely does not belong: 
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If something cannot be done to check, or at least to modify, our 
monstrous worship of facts, art will become sterile, and beauty will pass 
away from the land. (Wilde, 2002, p. 145) 
Vivian believes that if facts do indeed infiltrate the artistic territory, and art becomes too 
representative of reality, it might lose its power of revealing new impressions and of stirring 
imaginations. If no difference is to be found between art and life, then why should one bother 
to produce art in the first place, since there will be nothing in it that life is not already able 
to provide? This is one of the reasons why, “as a method, realism is a complete failure” 
(Wilde, 2002, p. 153). 
It should not follow, however, that the concept of truth in art is of no interest to Wilde. As 
he puts it, art should be true indeed, but true in the only way a work of art can be true, not 
true as a newspaper article must account for the real facts exactly how they happened.  
It might be of help to look at what Wilde says about this artistic (or aesthetic) truth in De 
Profundis before delving deeper into the essay at hand: 
Truth in Art is not any correspondence between the essential idea and the 
accidental existence; it is not the resemblance of shape to shadow, or of 
the form mirrored in the crystal to the form itself: it is no Echo coming 
from a hollow hill, any more than it is the well of silver water in the valley 
that shows the Moon to the Moon and Narcissus to Narcissus. Truth in 
Art is the unity of a thing with itself: the outward rendered expressive of 
the inward: the soul made incarnate: the body instinct with spirit (Wilde, 
2002, p. 65). 
Alluding to chapter X of The Republic, Wilde makes it very clear that he is not dealing with 
truth in the Platonic sense of the word – “it is not the resemblance of shape [object] to 
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shadow [ideal]”. Art is not to be placed against anything other than itself in order to assess 
its truthfulness. For instance, it would prove rather worthless that one took Francis Ponge’s 
poem “Le Pain” and held it against an actual piece of bread in order to assess its accuracy. 
Truth in art is not to be assessed by the resemblance it bears to a particular object, or, to that 
extent, life itself.  
True art, as Wilde conceives it, depends on its “unity” with no other than itself, which is 
quite a curious remark to make, because it is hard to think of a situation in which we could 
say something is true without relying on an outside referent. And yet, if truth in art is nothing 
but the “unity of a thing with itself”, then everything would be true in that everything is itself.  
But Wilde means something a little different than this, and he will indeed rely on a particular 
type of referent – the imagination.  
Describing truth, Wilde indicates that the proximity of an “outward” something with its 
“inward” manifestation is a valid enough criterion to validate its trueness. If the outward and 
the inward of something are one, then it should be true. While the outward corresponds to 
the object itself, its material shape, the inward will be made to correspond to the artist’s 
‘spirit’. If we follow this line of thought, a true work of art depends only on its 
correspondence with the artist’s imagination – that is, the collection of his or her impressions. 
This transfers truth into a very particular, solipsistic sphere – truth is a private, individual 
experience that needs no exterior sanctioning. In “Critic as Artist”, one of Wilde’s characters 
will ask “what is truth?” only to retort that “in matters of art, it is one’s last mood” (Wilde, 
2002, p. 227). When it comes to art, there are as many truths as there are artists, provided that 
they rely on their imagination and not on mere imitation of reality. 
The first argument Wilde makes in favour of his new theory of aesthetics is then that “Art 
never expresses anything but itself” (Wilde, 2002, p. 167). It is both self-sufficient and self-
 16 
representative in that it depends on nothing but the artist’s spirit and its resemblance to this 
spirit is the only validation or sanction it requires.  
The extreme importance Wilde places on individual experience (and also his opinion that 
reality does not have a place in art) can be traced back to Walter Pater’s arguments in The 
Renaissance. In its “Conclusion”, Pater writes that: 
At first sight experience seems to bury us under a flood of external 
objects, pressing upon us with a sharp and importunate reality, calling us 
out of ourselves in a thousand forms of action.  
But when reflexion begins to play upon those objects they are dissipated 
under its influence; the cohesive force seems suspended like some trick of 
magic; each object is loosed into a group of impressions—colour, odour, 
texture—in the mind of the observer. And if we continue to dwell in 
thought on this world, not of objects in the solidity with which language 
invests them, but of impressions, unstable, flickering, inconsistent, which 
burn and are extinguished with our consciousness of them, it contracts 
still further: the whole scope of observation is dwarfed into the narrow 
chamber of the individual mind. (Pater, 1980, p. 187) 
The above quotation makes it clear that Pater would concur with Wilde that reality, 
“importunate reality”, is outside the scope of art, which depends highly on the impressions 
“of the individual mind”. This is, in fact, the sole thing able to make art original – originality, 
as opposed to imitation, having become an important characteristic of artistic labour since 
romanticism.  
Nevertheless, Pater’s “Conclusion” seems to offer a milder version of what will become 
Wilde’s aesthetic theory. While Pater’s aestheticism dwells in the realms of impressions and 
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contemplation alone, Wilde takes his arguments a step further and actually suggests that 
“lying” – that is, representing a thing according to one’s own subjectivity as opposed to 
reality – is much necessary to salvage art (and even society) from falling in the dullness of 
realism. In his later works, Wilde will imply that it is necessary that we “beautify” reality, that 
we improve nature and, ultimately, that we live aesthetically, or beautifully, transforming our 
own lives into works of art.  
The great importance Wilde attributes to the artist’s subjectivity stems in part from his belief 
that it is one with the artistic temperament and it is the only source of inspiration for art. 
Aware that his conjecture goes directly against what Matthew Arnold had established as the 
standard for criticism years before, that it relied in seeing “the object as in itself it really is” 
(Arnold, 1865), Wilde takes it upon himself to correct Arnold saying that “no great artist 
ever sees things as they really are” (Wilde, 2002, p. 166).  
We have, however, to be able to admit that this subjectivity might also be put to use in the 
realm of ethics. If art owes nothing to reality then, it is only logical that it owes nothing to 
morals, so they are as liable of getting distorted as is any other object or concept. Just as art 
should not be judged by its verisimilitude to life, so must it not be judged by its conformity 
to ruling morals.  
So, in saying that “Art never expresses anything but itself”, Vivian is also making a powerful 
ethical comment – that just as art deals with a truth that is artistic, so it might deal with a 
different type of morals, one which allows no judgements about art to be made. Relying on 
this characteristic of art, Wilde is then perfectly at ease to praise actions that are usually 
condemnable, such as lying. Richard Ellman draws our attention to this point, when he says 
that 
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Each of the four essays that make up Intentions is to some degree 
subversive, as if to demonstrate that the intentions of the artist are not 
strictly honourable. The first and the last, “The Decay of Lying” and “The 
Truth of Masks,” celebrate art for rejecting truths, faces and all that 
paraphernalia in favour of lies and masks. Wilde doesn’t do this in the 
romantic way of extolling the imagination, for while he uses that word, he 
is a little chary of it; the imagination is itself too natural, too involuntary 
for his process of art. He prefers lying because it sounds more wilful, 
because it is no outpouring of the self but a conscious effort to mislead. 
(Ellman, 1969) 
It is likely that Wilde is aware of the dichotomy that he has just created between art and 
ethics, and that he himself is divided between an attempt to justify the validity of his own art 
and, at the same time the consciousness that what he is doing is highly subversive from a 
19th century ethical standpoint. In other words, Wilde’s thesis might be subversive from an 
ethical point of view, but as an exaltation of individual freedom it is perfectly justifiable. 
Wilde’s arguments imply that an artist should be free to sculpt, paint or write about anything 
he so pleases without heeding to any kind of external validation. But what this also means is 
that an artist is not bound by any societal rules or codes of conduct for “the aim of the liar 
is simply to charm, to delight, to give pleasure” (Wilde, 2002, p. 156) and not to indoctrinate 
or teach. 
Vivian is thus placing art at an independent level from, as opposed to subordinate to life and 
morals. This placement is not only evident in the “Decay of Lying” but also in The Picture of 
Dorian Gray, as we shall see further ahead. Wilde’s character finds his justification in claiming 
that 
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Art finds her own perfection within, and not outside of, herself. She is not 
to be judged by any external resemblance. She is a veil rather than a mirror 
(…) Hers are the ‘forms more real than the living man,’ and hers the great 
archetypes of which things that have existence are but unfinished copies. 
(Wilde, 2002, p. 157) 
Although Vivian seems to imply that art actually precedes life, we should take it in the sense 
that art is always ahead of life, and that life’s “unfinished copies” are always behind the “great 
archetypes” that art creates. Previously in the article, Vivian had already conceded that life 
might serve as “rough material” (Wilde, 2002, p. 152) for art, which it will mould into a most 
perfect shape. The process through which art transforms life into a more perfect version of 
what it really is, is best described in “The Critic as Artist” and has to do with the artist’s 
critical spirit of selection. When dealing with such a rough material as life, the artist will 
carefully select but the parts of it which are beautiful and worth presenting. This is the reason 
why art might resemble life in a way, given that it has been its rough material, but will always 
be better than life.  
By showing life what it could be, and due to life’s natural imitative instinct, we will inevitably 
adopt an artistic point of view when looking at our surroundings. In a sense, art might 
attribute meaning to life, even. Take the following example: 
Where, if not from the Impressionists, do we get those wonderful brown 
fogs that come creeping down our streets, blurring the gas-lamps and 
changing the houses into monstrous shadows? To whom, if not to them 
and their master, do we owe the lovely silver mists that brood over our 
river, and turn to faint forms of fading grace curved bridge and swaying 
barge? The extraordinary change that has taken place in the climate of 
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London during the last ten years is entirely due to a particular school of 
art. (Wilde, 2002, p. 162) 
The particular case of the London fog can be extended to a series of different situations. It 
is through art that we learn to give meaning to reality. Further on, Vivian summarises his 
point saying that “things are because we see them, and what we see, and how we see it, 
depends on the arts that have influenced us.” Vivian’s argument is not difficult to support. 
Think of how we all have looked at a particular scene and, because of the light arrangements, 
because of the particular disposition of the objects or the nature of the actions we are 
testifying, said that “it’s just like a movie”? The only reason why we are able to make such a 
statement is because at least one film director has had the sensibility to transpose his 
impressions into a film scene and our instinct imitates that very impression when we witness 
something similar. When we do it, we are exercising our own critical spirit, selecting from 
the scene just what makes it beautiful and worthy of being transformed into art. This is how 
art can teach us about life and why “life is art’s best, art’s only pupil” (Wilde, 2002, p. 158). 
From here follows Wilde’s doctrine that “life imitates art far more than art imitates life” 
(Wilde, 2002, p. 158) – because we tend to interpret life according to what art has given us. 
But what to say of morals?  
Vivian is also aware that art can also influence our code of conduct, but this is a path to be 
treaded carefully. In the essay at hand, Vivian will indeed give some examples of people 
whose conduct was deeply affected by the reading of a particular novel.  
The most obvious and the vulgarest form in which this is shown is in the 
case of the silly boys who, after reading the adventures of Jack Sheppard 
or Dick Turpin, pillage the stalls of unfortunate apple-women, break into 
sweet-shops at night, and alarm old gentlemen who are returning home 
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from the city by leaping out on them in suburban lanes, with black masks 
and unloaded revolvers. (Wilde, 2002, p. 159) 
These are, of course, exaggerations, and such imitations are even discouraged, but these 
examples are enough to sustain that he recognised the extent to which art could have an 
effect on human action.  
This particular concern will resurface in De Profundis, where Wilde shows interest in 
eventually elaborating on the subject of “The Artistic life considered in its relation to 
Conduct” (Wilde, 2002, p. 80), which seems ironic given that his own artistic life has led him 
to prison, as he so notes: 
As regards (…) the relation of the artistic life to conduct, it will no doubt 
seem strange to you that I should select it. People point to Reading Gaol, 
and say ‘There is where the artistic life leads a man.’ (Wilde, 2002, p. 84) 
Wilde accepts, then, that an artistic life might be synonyms with subversion and that the main 
problem this represents is related to a conflict between ethics and aesthetics - an artistic, 
aesthetic life leads a man to be unethical and wind up in prison. Wilde’s solution to this 
problem will be to say that if life is a reflection of art, then it should be best to look at it from 
an aesthetic point of view rather than an ethical one.  
Aesthetics are able to give life something that ethics cannot. This is also posited in “The 
Critic as Artist”, when Gilbert concludes that: 
To be good, according to the vulgar standard of goodness, is obviously 
quite easy. It merely requires a certain amount of sordid terror, a certain 
lack of imaginative thought, and a certain low passion for middle-class 
respectability. Aesthetics are higher than ethics. They belong to a more 
spiritual sphere. To discern the beauty of a thing is the finest point to 
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which we can arrive (…) Ethics, like natural selection, make existence 
possible. Aesthetics, like sexual selection, make life lovely and wonderful, 
fill it with new forms and give it progress, and variety and change. (Wilde, 
2002, p. 242) 
This derives in part from the fact that aesthetics are more perfect than life and ethics as they 
are the result of an artistic temperament, which has carefully selected from life and ethics 
just what was good in them. Ethics “make existence possible”, but aesthetics make it 
beautiful. Gilbert then makes aesthetics superior to ethics by saying that the capacity of 
recognising beauty is the highest achievable objective, not “middle-class respectability” or 
moral virtue, for that matter. Ethics are too dependent on social codes and paradigms, which 
are ever-changing, whereas aesthetics, depending on nothing but the individual and speaking 
to that which is common amongst all, are universal. 
Now, what sems to be implied here is that the ultimate source of conduct codes and laws in 
human nature should be, invariably, art. Without it, it would feel as if our surroundings were 
in a state of chronic disorder and it is art’s aim – because it is born of a restructuring process 
of the impressions the artist is subject to – to structure that very chaos and to provide life 
with a sort of order. To Jonathan Dollimore, “life is at best an energy which can only find 
expression through the forms which art offers it” (Dollimore, 1996, p. 11). Wilde’s 
aestheticism is thus both an aesthetic theory and a will to reorganise the world according to 







The improved version of the world Oscar Wilde was constantly after might have been 
attempted at his writing The Picture of Dorian Gray, first published in the June 1890 edition of 
the Lippincott’s Magazine and then again in April 1891 in its book form, with additional 
chapters and a preface.  
During the time between the novel’s first appearance in Lippincott’s and its publishing in 1891, 
The Picture of Dorian Gray was the object of several unflattering reviews by many a literary 
critic who deemed it an immoral, disreputable work of art. While most of these reviews were 
not given any credit or reaction, in a letter dated 26th June 1890 to the Editor of the St James’s 
Gazette, Wilde admits to “taking public notice of only three” (Wilde, 2000, p. 447). In these 
three occasions, Wilde took it upon himself to both correct and educate his reviewers on 
what concerned their views on his novel, especially from a moral standpoint.   
Despite their indisputable rhetoric merit, Wilde’s retorts offer invaluable insights into the 
author’s own understanding of Dorian Gray as a moral novel, or, at least, a novel with a moral. 
To those who accused him of writing an immoral novel, Wilde replies saying that quite on 
the contrary, Dorian Gray is a book with, if anything, an all too apparent moral, one which 
anyone “whose minds are healthy” (Wilde, 2000, p. 431) will be able to find in it: 
It [Dorian Gray] is a story with a moral: And the moral is this: All excess, 
as well as all renunciation, brings its own punishment. (Wilde, 2000, p. 
430) 
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Such a remark is hardly expected to be attributed to a 19th century aesthete, certainly not to 
one as Wilde. Considering this citation in itself, it would not be too wide a leap to infer that 
Dorian Gray is, in the end, a cautionary tale aimed at teaching said moral to its readers. Wilde 
himself seems to have caught on this possibility and so he made haste to justify his argument 
in more aesthetic terms, this time to the Editor of the Daily Chronicle: 
This moral is so far artistically and deliberately suppressed that it does not 
enunciate its law as a general principle, but realises itself purely in the lives 
of the individuals, and so becomes simply a dramatic element in a work 
of art, and not the object of the work of art itself. (Wilde, 2000, p. 435) 
Wilde does his best to make his critics believe that he had no intentions of writing a moral 
novel, and that above all, he was not himself a moral author, despite whatever moral can be 
found in his book. To the editor of the Scots Observer, Wilde writes several days later that his 
critic “commits the absolutely unpardonable crime of trying to confuse the artist with his 
subject-matter” and he lets him know that  
one stands remote from one’s subject-matter. One creates it, and one 
contemplates it. The further away the subject-matter is, the more freely 
can the artist work. Your reviewer suggests that I do not make it 
sufficiently clear whether I prefer virtue to wickedness or wickedness to 
virtue. An artist, sir, has no ethical sympathies at all. (Wilde, 2000, p. 439) 
Wilde’s defence so far is in accord with what he had written before on such essays as “The 
Decay of Lying”, namely that “art never expresses anything but itself”, and that whatever 
meaning could be attributed to Dorian Gray, he could not be held accountable for it. 
However, pondering that he had failed in “keeping the extremely obvious moral subordinate 
to the artistic and dramatic effect”, Wilde proposes to correct these “defect[s]” (Wilde, 2000, 
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p. 435) in the soon to be printed book edition and, as he believed that “the artist ha[d] to 
educate the critic” (Wilde, 2000, p. 447), he makes the decision of condensing most of the 
arguments cited above in the preface to 1891 edition, which acts not only as a summary of 
Wilde’s views on art and aestheticism, but also as an a priori defence to further possible 
criticism. 
The circumstances under which the preface - “probably the best-known statement of Oscar 
Wilde’s aesthetic position” (Quintus, 1980, p. 560) –, was written could well account for the 
assertive, authoritative even, tone Wilde adopts in it. He reminds his critics that as an artist 
he has no moral pretence of any kind as “no artist desires to prove anything” (Wilde, 2008, 
p. 3) and that books cannot be moral or immoral because making judgements of that kind is 
outside the scope of literature. Literature is free to use morality as a material, but it should 
not declare what is or is not moral. Wilde was a trenchant critic of didactic or pedagogical 
pretences in literature, and he most certainly would not want his book to be described as part 
of the lot.  
As one moves past the preface and further into the novel itself, one will find that Wilde puts 
the validity of his theories on art and life to test, making the book not just fiction, but an 
essay on art’s relation with life. Through Dorian’s character, Wilde examines to what degree 
art and life are interdependent, as we shall be able to see.  
The figure of Dorian is essentially that of a work of art masterfully crafted by the words of 
Lord Henry. Dorian will be influenced to such an extent as to alienate himself completely 
from standard moral codes and to lead a life ruled by nothing but aesthetic experience.  
 One of the most striking themes to surface in the novel is that of the influence exerted over 
the main character, which might well be the cause of his ultimate decline. In fact, influence 
seems to be a recurrent concern in Wilde’s work, having been dedicated some lines in his 
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critical essays and studied thoroughly in the novel, where the first reference to the subject 
reads that “all influence is immoral” (Wilde, 2008, p. 18). The phrase, attributed to Lord 
Henry, is peremptory in its condemnation of the practice of influencing someone. The basis 
for influence’s immorality lies in the assumption that, when influencing someone, we are in 
fact depriving them from their own individuality, causing them not to think according to 
their own thoughts or passions but, instead, according to our own.  
That influencing somebody to such an extent as to deplete them from the capacity to exercise 
their judgement anymore seems, indeed, indecent and immoral. This suggests, however, that 
there is a moral – right – thing to do, which one would think would be Lord Henry’s course 
of action towards Dorian. Despite proclaiming to be an individualist and an advocate for 
personal freedom, Lord Henry will, however, fail to comply with his own views and let 
himself be lured by the possibility of “moulding” Dorian Gray to his own image.  
When Dorian Gray is first introduced to Lord Henry, he is described as a god-like, unspoiled 
figure, one who “had kept himself unspotted from the world” (Wilde, 2008, p. 17), much 
like a child who still preserves the naive gayety of his early years. This unspottedness, 
however, is not one to last long and Basil Hallward seems to be well aware of this possibility. 
Conscious of Gray’s naivety, Basil repeatedly insists that Lord Henry should not make 
Dorian’s acquaintance lest he shall be the one to spoil him. Dismissive of the painter’s 
concerns, Lord Henry will indeed become acquainted with Dorian and be much responsible, 
however unintentionally, for his descent into corruption and decadence. 
Lord Henry’s witty remarks and paradoxical aphorisms will find in Dorian the perfect home, 
much as a parasite which has found the perfect host in which to accomplish its most primal 
objective of surviving and reproducing. No sooner does Dorian listen to Lord Henry than 
he feels that “fresh influences were at work within him” (Wilde, 2008, p. 19). Forces which 
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he had not known possible to be carried through words were now stirred inside him but “yet 
they seemed to him to have come really from himself”, and not from the speaker.  
What seems to be at work here, more than the obvious power play of which Lord Henry is 
well-aware (Dorian being an impressionable young man), is an almost perfect example of 
Wilde’s doctrine that “all art is at once surface and symbol [and that] those who read the 
symbol do so at their own peril. It is the spectator (…) that art really mirrors” (Wilde, 2008, 
p. 3). What Dorian is doing here, and will continue to do throughout the novel, is reading 
whichever symbols he interprets in Lord Henry’s words – “Mere words! How terrible they 
were!” (Wilde, 2008, p. 19) – and finding in them a meaning that was not necessarily intended 
by the speaker. The terrible words Dorian hears are no longer Lord Henry’s but his very own 
interpretation of them. Whichever way Dorian will decide to act upon them will be his own 
responsibility, fruit of his arguably poor judgement. Lord Henry “had merely shot an arrow 
into the air” (Wilde, 2008, p. 20), although not without a somewhat malicious intent. Lord 
Henry never actually tells Dorian what to do, but he exerts his influence in an ever more 
subtle way. “Poisoned” by Lord Henry’s rants on how life can only be fully conquered if 
lived beautifully rather than righteously, Dorian will quickly cast his morals aside in a quest 
for ever-lasting pleasure and debauchery.  
Lord Henry becomes deeply interested in exploring the enchanting power his words can 
exert over Dorian: 
Yes; he would try to be to Dorian Gray what, without knowing it, the lad 
was to the painter who had fashioned the wonderful portrait. He would 
seek to dominate him – had already, indeed, half done so. He would make 
that wonderful spirit his own. There was something fascinating in this son 
of Love and Death. (Wilde, 2008, p. 34) 
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It would be well to remember that Basil was extremely apprehensive of showing the painting 
exactly because he had put too much of himself in it and was afraid others could read in it 
some sort of secret he had accidentally revealed. What Dorian meant to Basil then, one might 
speculate, was a means for Basil to reveal himself. According to this logic, Lord Henry would 
then aim to be a means for Dorian to reveal his true self in turn.  
Dorian Gray will thus become similar to a work of art sculpted out of Lord Henry’s amoral 
aphorisms, one that is purely aesthetical and deeply alienated of traditional moral codes of 
conduct. This will allow us to look deeper into The Portrait of Dorian Gray as an aesthetic 
experience in which Wilde will test the limits to his own theories on life and art, the outcome 
of which I will pursue further in this study. 
We have seen how words play a crucial role in the novel. What Julia Brown says of Wilde’s 
plays – that “everything here is determined by language” (Brown, 1997, p. 89) – might well 
be said of the novel. No doubt, Lord Henry’s language had already produced an effect on 
Dorian as he filled him “with a wild desire to know everything about life” (Wilde, 2008, p. 
43) and led him on a never-ending quest for the pleasures and sensations of life, but there is 
yet another fundamental moment in which language will exert its influence on Dorian. This 
time, by means of “the yellow book that Lord Henry had sent him” (Wilde, 2008, p. 107). 
Having become enamoured with the book, Dorian will forever be haunted with an 
uncontrollable desire to emulate the main character’s experiences: 
For years, Dorian Gray could not free himself from the influence of this 
book. Or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that he never sought 
to free himself from it. (…) The hero, the wonderful young Parisian, in 
whom the romantic and the scientific temperaments were so strangely 
blended, became to him a kind of prefiguring type of himself. And, 
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indeed, the whole book seemed to him to contain the story of his own 
life, written before he had lived it. (Wilde, 2008, p. 108)  
One might say that the book’s influence on Dorian will grow until the moment of his death, 
and the reason why he could not free himself from it was probably due to the fact that he 
found in it the validation of his inherited doctrine that: 
The true nature of the senses had never been understood, and that they 
had remained savage and animal merely because the world had sought to 
starve them into submission or to kill them by pain, instead of making 
them elements of a new spirituality, of which a fine instinct for beauty was 
to be the dominant characteristic. (Wilde, 2008, p. 110) 
But what the oblivious “world” did not know was that “the only way to get rid of a 
temptation is to yield to it” (Wilde, 2008, p. 19). Instead, this middle-class-equivalent “world” 
is too deeply rooted in Victorian conservative morals to know what only the few elect did – 
that the aim of life is to live beautifully. Dorian could now see beyond this restraining way 
of life – he was to discover the New Hedonism Lord Henry so often talked about and to 
which the main character of the yellow book dedicated his whole existence.  
Now, parallel to Lord Henry’s influence over Dorian, there happens a most decisive event 
right at the beginning of the novel, the one it is best known for: Dorian’s utterance of a wish 
that the painting would grow old instead of himself will unfold the major event leading to 
his decline – the very accomplishment of this wish. There happens a metempsychosis-like 
process between Dorian and the painting, in which both entities exchange qualities. If, like 
we stated above, Dorian’s life will correspond to art, art shall correspond to life in return.  
When Dorian first sees Basil Hallward’s painting, the metempsychosis pact is sealed. Once 
Lord Henry had made him aware of the evasiveness and preciousness of his beauty, Dorian 
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becomes extremely anxious about losing it and becomes jealous of the agelessness of the 
painting: 
It will never be older than this particular day of June… if it were only the 
other way. If it were to be I who was to be always young, and the picture 
that was to grow old! For that – for that – I would give everything!... I 
would give my soul for that! (Wilde, 2008, p. 25) 
No sooner does he finish his sentence than he strikes the very bargain he has wished for. 
Just as one sells their soul to the devil in exchange of a miraculous gift, so does Dorian sell 
his to art, so that he may remain forever young and be spared the witnessing his beauty’s 
decay.  
Selling one’s soul is a fairly common trope in literature, and the transaction usually involves 
an ambitious buyer and an ill-intentioned, demonic at times, seller - in this case, art. Wilde 
seems to be implying that there is something demonic about art, that it has the power of 
trapping one’s soul and make one do something immoral. This suggestion seems to be in 
accord with Plato’s theory that there is a property in art capable of both seducing us and 
conditioning the way we behave.  
What’s more, Wilde also appears to be hinting at the idea of “original sin”. While Dorian is 
blissfully ignorant of his beauty, he is happy and remains “unspotted”. As soon as he is given 
the “apple” of aestheticism to bite, he becomes aware of the ephemerality of the real word 
and begins to yearn for immortality and eternal splendour. Figuratively speaking, the 
tempting demon of Eden has been replaced with art. Dorian might not ever be cast out of 
the Garden and instead get to know further exquisite pleasures and joys, but the pact he 
sealed will come at a cost, nonetheless. 
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Although we have already documented Lord Henry’s influence on Dorian above, it might be 
well to look further at his role as Dorian’s architect. If “to influence a person is to give him 
one’s own soul”, then Dorian ceases to be an individual and becomes a reflexion of Lord 
Henry. His part as a creator of a living work of art is further emphasised through his wish to 
“dominate him – had already indeed, half done so. He would make that wonderful spirit his 
own.” Essentially, Dorian embodies an effort on the part of Lord Henry to generate an ideal 
which will demonstrate something “far richer than the Hellenic ideal.” Dorian himself is well 
aware of this Pygmalion-like relationship between them, as he tells Henry that he had filled 
him “with a weird desire to know everything about life. For days after I met you, something 
seemed to throb in my veins.” (Wilde, 2008, p. 43) 
Indeed, after this transformation, Dorian will become an inhabitant of a sort of aesthetic 
utopia of pure beauty and sensation, as far away from reality and its conventions as possible. 
Dorian is not, however, the only character to live in such an alienated state. Julia Brown 
suggests that “Sybil, James, and Mrs. Vane all live out their personal lives in the thrall of 
either melodrama or tragedy” (Brown, 1997, p. 82). They all become the embodiment of 
works of art of some sort. Mrs. Vane is a completely hollow character, devoid of any 
personality traits other than the histrionic mannerisms she has so often performed on stage; 
and James, despite not being an actor himself, ends up reduced to a literary cliché of the 
“Avenging Brother” representative of the “working class resentiment”, whose death is nothing 
short of comically meaningless.  
As to Sybil, “she performs the role of Juliet in her own life, as she has on stage, when she 
kills herself”. Analogously to Dorian, Sybil – of all Vane family members – also inhabits a 
world of pure artistic illusion – in a fairy-tale-like dimension, even. Sybil lives in a utopian 
fantasy in which she has been nothing but the characters she has performed on stage, much 
like Dorian embodies the characteristics of his portrait.  
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Unlike Dorian, however, Sybil seems completely oblivious of the fact, whereas he will remain 
aware of the circumstances that led him into that very world. It will not be until she falls in 
love with him that Sybil will wake up from this trance-like state only to realise that “acting 
was the one reality of my life. It was only in the theatre that I lived. I thought it was all true” 
(Wilde, 2008, p. 74). Now that she had seen “reality”, there was no going back, as she 
explicitly tells Dorian: 
I knew nothing but shadows, and I thought them real. You came (…) and 
you freed my soul from prison. You taught me what reality really is (…) 
You had brought me something higher, something of which all art is but 
a reflection. (Wilde, 2008, pp. 74-5) 
To Dorian, who had decided to completely shun reality, this stark reminder of its existence 
was to him as hideous a thing as he could imagine. He could not bear to hear Sybil praise 
reality so much – to him, she was casting away her most precious possession, her art, one 
Dorian was so fond of and the sole reason why he had loved her in the first place. It doesn’t 
come as a surprise, then, that he scolds her for having murdered his love: 
You used to stir my imagination. Now you don’t even stir my curiosity. 
You simply produce no effect. I loved you because you were marvellous 
(…) and gave shape and substance to the shadows of art. You have 
thrown it all away. You are shallow and stupid. (Wilde, 2008, p. 75) 
In emerging from her illusory world, Sybil becomes a mere fact, something that doesn’t 
produce any effect, as boring as life. She will, however, feel the pangs of reality deeply as she 
learns that Dorian does not love her anymore. She awoke to a crude world of agony, too 
painful to bear, and she feels that the only way to escape from it is to embody art one last 
time and put an end to her life just like the Juliet she had so often performed. In doing so, 
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Sybil re-enters the fantastic world of artistic illusion from which she had emerged. Art was 
the only possible redemption, the only way out of such a terrible reality. Sybil’s death is 
narrowly equivalent to the death of Dorian Gray – just as she dies the moment she has arisen 
from her fictive world, so will Dorian when he so arises.   
At first, the kind of transformation that occurs between Dorian and the painting will allow 
him to inhabit this “fictive world” and go through life almost with complete impunity, being 
free to exercise Lord Henry’s suggestions without much concern. In fact, Lord Henry might 
even be to one to blame for this metempsychosis, given that had it not been for him, Dorian 
would probably have never been aware of the fleeting, fragile condition of his beauty and 
would not have given in to such anxiety as made him sell his soul. The awareness of this 
condition, however, will never leave him and reality will begin to slowly intrude itself upon 
him. 
It is not until Dorian’s temper tantrum with Sybil Vane that he will become aware that 
something is happening between him and the painting. Upon returning home after their 
tumultuous break-up and looking up at the picture hanging on his living-room wall, Dorian 
“started back as if in surprise (…) [because] the expression looked different. One would say 
that there was a touch of cruelty in the mouth.” (Wilde, 2008, p. 78) It is not long until 
Dorian realises why the painting had indeed changed. It had something to do with Sybil 
though he did not know exactly what. Sure, he had been faintly mean to her, but according 
to Lord Henry, such was the pettiness of love and women. There was no reason whatsoever 
for him to be concerned about her nor his action. He was entitled to have treated her the 
way he did because she had been the one spoiling his fantasy. 
Yet, the painting reminded him that something had indeed happened, and Dorian lacked 
Lord Henry’s nonchalance not to worry about it.  At this precise moment, he realises that 
there had occurred a division inside him. It’s as though his soul had left his body to incarnate 
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the picture and the picture’s agelessness had come to inhabit his body Interestingly enough, 
Wilde seems to signal this very division by resorting to a play of opposites to describe the 
painting’s “beautiful marred face and its cruel smile” (Wilde, 2008, p. 79) . 
Now, “marred” and “cruel” are both moral attributes. The portrait would not just bear sign 
of the passage of time. It “would be to him the visible emblem of his conscience” (Wilde, 
2008, p. 79). As Julia Brown puts it, “Dorian’s new life is not etched on his face but mirrored 
in the physiognomy of the portrait” (Brown, 1997, p. 79). 
Dorian’s first reaction is to repent: 
He would resist temptation. He would not see Lord Henry any more – 
would not, at any rate, listen to those subtle poisonous theories that in 
Basil’s Hallward’s garden had first stirred within him the passion for 
impossible things.” (Wilde, 2008, p. 79) 
For a short period of time, Dorian is determined to make of his picture a guide to life, one 
that would show him exactly whenever he had been “bad”. In this particular case, art acts as 
a sort of morality standard against which Dorian will compare his actions in order to properly 
evaluate them. Again, life is learning about itself directly from art. 
This attitude, however, does not last long. Dorian’s guilt after he has committed something 
condemnable is similar in a way to what psychologists call Post-Coital Tristesse – a sudden 
feeling of guilt that follows the orgasm and leads people to think that they will never 
masturbate anymore, for example. In many cases, people will indeed masturbate again, as 
soon as they are feeling aroused the next time round.  
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Dorian acts in a similar way – after he has either unleashed his anger or experimented a new 
pleasure, he will feel a pang of consciousness which will lead him to think he will not do it 
again, but only up until the moment he experiences the urge to “feel” again.  
In such a situation, it is extremely easy for him to dismiss any moral values: 
He felt that the time had really come for making his choice. Or had his 
choice already been made? Yes, life had decided that for him – life, and 
his own infinite curiosity about life. Eternal youth, infinite passion, 
pleasures subtle and secret, wild joys and wilder sins – he was to have all 
these things. The portrait was to bear the burden of his shame: that was 
all. (Wilde, 2008, p. 90) 
These feelings of guilt and subsequent dismissal of his consciousness are representative of 
Dorian’s emerging and then plunging back in the aesthetic utopia we saw above. This 
exercise, however, will prove most difficult after Basil Hallward’s murder. If in the wake of 
his horrible act Dorian seems to be completely detached from it, it will not be long until his 
peace is disturbed by intruding, obsessive moral thoughts that will fill him with anxiety. 
As he was reading Gautier’s “Émaux et Camées” in the hope he would forget about the 
incident, he is suddenly assaulted with memories of Basil. As he reads about the “‘monstre 
charmant’ that couches in the porphyry-room of the Louvre” (Wilde, 2008, p. 139), the book 
falls from his hand as if he had been reminded that he was that very monster. His were the 
most charming looks, and yet, his actions had made him a monster – “a beautiful caged 
thing” (Wilde, 2008, p. 140), shackled by the consciousness he could not escape from.  
For a moment he thought that disposing of the body had put an end to his suffering, and 
“he himself could not help wondering at the calm of his demeanour” (Wilde, 2008, p. 147), 
but he soon becomes “irritable, and out of temper” (Wilde, 2008, p. 153). He will find that 
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the only way to prevent his subduing to the consciousness of the immorality of his actions 
would be to numb the senses by recurring to opium so as to 
‘cure the soul by means of the senses, and the senses by means of the 
soul!’ How the words rang in his ears! His soul, certainly, was sick to death. 
Was it true that the senses could cure it? Innocent blood had been spilt. 
What could atone for that? Ah! For that there was no atonement; but 
though forgiveness was impossible, forgetfulness was possible still, and 
he was determined to forget, to stamp the thing out, to crush it as one 
would crush the adder that had one. (Wilde, 2008, pp. 155-6) 
For a while, he will be able to return to the aesthetic realm, but immediately after James 
Vane’s death, Dorian is seen emerging from this utopia and letting himself be influenced by 
the real world once again, becoming what Oscar Wilde would consider a “bad” work of art. 
Dorian begins to develop a strong sense of sin and vows to make his life moral as well as 
beautiful, not realising that this was no longer possible for him. Dorian is constantly 
incapable of establishing his own values, constantly recurring to Lord Henry for spiritual 
counsel. When he tells him he will now try to be both “good” and “beautiful”, Lord Henry 
is dismissive of his aspirations and says that “there is no use in your telling me that you are 
going to be good (…) you are quite perfect. Pray, don’t change” (Wilde, 2008, p. 176), to 
which Dorian retorts saying that he has done “far too many dreadful things”. 
At this point, Dorian is convinced that he had done the “right thing” by breaking up with a 
village girl with whom he had had an affair. Lord Henry, however, reminds him that despite 
his good intentions, he had nonetheless broken the girl’s heart. Now, Dorian had never 
realised that to be good, it would take more than a simple good intention. After all, what he 
does to this girl is in no way different to what he had done to Sybil Vane some years before.  
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He then begs Lord Henry not to let anyone else have access to the poisonous book that he 
had once lent him, not realising that – as Lord Henry hastes to remind him – “Art has no 
influence upon action” (Wilde, 2008, p. 183), and that he committed those dreadful acts 
because he wanted to, not because he was forced to. Just as Wilde had written in the 
“Preface” to the novel, “it is the spectator, and not life, that art really mirrors.” The book 
had merely reflected something that already was part of Dorian.  
Upon this realisation, Dorian begins to long for the “unspotted” beauty of his innocent self 
– “his rose-white boyhood, as Lord Henry had once called it” (Wilde, 2008, p. 184), as 
opposed to his previous mad desires to feel each and every sensation life could possibly offer 
him. He had tried it, and he has come to realise that an aesthetic life had brought him nothing 
but suffering. His attempts to once again reunite the concepts of “beautiful” and “good” will 
make the painting reflect “a look of cunning, and in the mouth the curved wrinkle of the 
hypocrite” (Wilde, 2008, p. 186).  At this moment, Dorian begins to wonder whether his 
previous intentions of redemption had actually been sincere or rather the mere indulgence 
in a newly fabricated sensation and he realises that his redemption rested on nothing but an 
egotistical, artificially created notion of purity and innocence. He asks himself whether it had 
been “merely vanity that had made him do his one good deed” (Wilde, 2008, p. 186) and, if 
so, then this deed was no different than all others. It was not necessarily good, as it was 
artificial: 
Through vanity he had spared her [the village girl]. In hypocrisy he had 
worn the mask of goodness. For curiosity’s sake he had tried the denial of 
self. He recognized that now. (Wilde, 2008, p. 187) 
He can no longer tolerate the impossibility of atoning for his sins that were “to dog him all 
his life” (Wilde, 2008, p. 187), so the only solution left is to destroy the bitter reminder of 
 38 
his soul – the picture itself. By destroying the objectification of his conscience, he is himself 
destroyed at last.  
In light of Wilde’s theory of aesthetics, it might seem a bit difficult to comprehend his 
negative depiction of Dorian Gray. After all, Dorian had been one who put Wilde’s 
“teachings” to practice, and one would expect a more positive outcome so as to validate the 
theories he had advanced in Intentions. In a major turn of events, the novel could actually 
condemn the very arguments Wilde had put forth. 
If, however, morality to Wilde is but a material for his art, he could have told Dorian Gray’s 
story in any way he so pleased without ever having to account for moral or “ethical 
sympathies”. Nevertheless, this does not mean that Wilde did not end up choosing a moral 
side, and he himself in the preface seems to run counter to some sympathies recorded in the 
novel. As John Allen Quintus puts it,  
if the novel closed with Dorian’s clicking his heels at a debutante’s ball, it 
would perhaps have fulfilled the expectations raised by the preface. 
(Quintus, 1980, p. 561) 
Instead, the reader is presented with a very different ending for a guilt-stricken Dorian who 
sees no possible escape from his conscience but to take his own life. This hypothesis is 
corroborated by Wilde himself, who, in the previously cited letter to the Editor of the Daily 
Chronicle had already described Dorian as 
Extremely impulsive, absurdly romantic, and (…) haunted all through his 
life by an exaggerated sense of conscience which mars his pleasures for 
him and warns him that youth and enjoyment are not everything in the 
world. It is finally to get rid of the conscience that had dogged his steps 
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from year to year that he destroys the picture; and thus in his attempt to 
kill conscience Dorian Gray kills himself. (Wilde, 2000, p. 436) 
Putting his main character to rest seems like an ethical sympathy on Wilde’s part – trying to 
make him atone for the atrocities he had committed in the only possible way.  
Although morals might not have been Wilde’s primary concern, it is undeniable that moral 
conceptions of “good” and “bad” play a vital role in the plot. Dorian, however, fails to 
understand by himself just exactly what is good and what is bad, having to rely on the 
painting’s metamorphosis for that distinction, and always a posteriori. Dorian fails to make 
this distinction by himself, just as he fails to realise that art, be it the book or the painting, 
does not compel him to act in any particular way. In a letter to R. Clegg dated April 1891, 
Wilde says that “if the contemplation of a work of art is followed by activity of any kind, the 
work is either of a very second-rate order, or the spectator has failed to realise the complete 
artistic impression” (Wilde, 2000, p. 478). As Joseph Bristow notes in the “Introduction” to 
the edition at hand, Dorian Gray seems to suffer from that very lack of realisation, as he 
subjects the “yellow book” to “a very narrow interpretation” (Wilde, 2008, p. xv). Such a 
narrow interpretation is akin to that of the “silly boys” in “The Decay of Lying” who had 
read adventure novels and, subduing to life’s imitative instinct, decided to emulate their 
characters’ mischiefs. Knowing very little of this instinct, Dorian believed that the acts he 
had committed were forced on him by both his listening to Lord Henry’s words and his 
reading of the “poisonous” novel he had borrowed from him.  
If nothing else, Oscar Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray proves that it is impossible for a man 
to ever live in a purely aesthetic manner. In the end, aestheticism might be a powerful 
watchword under which to judge and produce art, but it has never been intended as a guide 
to life. By trying to live by it, and paying no mind whatsoever to moral concerns, Dorian 
Gray fins his own doom. Oscar Wilde reminds us that we should be as wary of aestheticism 
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as of any other literary school of thought. Even Wilde himself does not live by it; he simply 
feigns to. His life is no work of art, instead it is as a work of art, in that it is an illusion, an 








In “The Soul of Man Under Socialism”, published in the February 1891 issue of the Fortnightly 
Review, Wilde advances both his notion of what individualism is and the necessary political 
changes to take place for this temperament to develop. It would be best to note, however, 
that while Wilde does engage in some political thinking, “The Soul of Man Under Socialism” 
is not a political essay with a clear political intent of leading the country into a reform.  
According to Lawrence Danson, “the real achievement of ‘The Soul of Man Under 
Socialism’ is not as a theory or manifesto but as a realization and demonstration.” (Danson, 
1998, pp. 157-8) As a rhetorical exercise, “The Soul of Man Under Socialism” is extremely 
successful: Wilde’s arguments are clear in that they identify a problem and readily offer a 
solution. According to Wilde, English individuals spend too much time worrying about other 
people’s problems to focus on developing themselves. The only way to alter this paradigm 
would be to eradicate other people’s problems once and for all. According to Wilde, English 
society is trapped in a sort of vicious circle that could be more or less described as such: a 
problem exists (i), men worry about that problem (ii), they try to find a solution (iii), the 
solution is ineffective, and the problem persists (iv), so men continue worrying about it (i), 
etc.  
To Wilde, the only possible solution to this problem would be to “try and reconstruct society 
on such a basis that poverty will be impossible”, starting with the abolishment of private 
property. According to Wilde, not only is the ownership of private property a nuisance for 
those who have it, it is also the fuel that maintains an oppressive system from which those 
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who do not own it cannot escape. These are the ones condemned to “live like a badly fed 
animal” and to work like “beasts of burden” (Wilde, 2002, p. 250), only to perpetuate their 
suffering.  
Abolishing private property would make it possible for every man to partake in a communal 
wealth, and this would bring about numerous benefits, spanning from the eradication of 
poverty and starvation to the eradication of crime. This system of property-holding is, 
however, too deeply rooted in English society. So much so, that “the English law has always 
treated offences against a man’s property with far more severity than offences against his 
person.” (Wilde, 2002, p. 253) What English society should be able to realise, though, is that 
“the true perfection of man lies, not in what man has, but in what man is” (Wilde, 2002, p. 
252), but the underlying problem is that society as it is does not permit men to realise himself: 
One’s regret is that society should be constructed on such a basis that man 
has been forced into a groove in which he cannot freely develop what is 
wonderful, and fascinating and delightful in him – in which, in fact, he 
misses the true pleasure and joy of living. (Wilde, 2002, p. 253) 
Another hindrance to men realising their full potential is directly related with the type of 
labour they are forced to undertake. Manual labour is, in Wilde’s view, both “degrading” and 
“morally injurious to man” (Wilde, 2002, p. 260) simply because he is not to find pleasure in 
it. It follows, then, that for society to achieve this perfect state of individualism, it would be 
necessary for men to stop working. But how could a society in which nobody produced any 
manual labour sustain itself? Again, Wilde has the solution at the ready: “All unintellectual 
labour, all monotonous, dull labour, all labour that deals with dreadful things and involves 
unpleasant conditions, must be done by machinery” (Wilde, 2002, p. 260). 
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One would be wrong, however, to judge Wilde’s ideas for their practicality. Not unlike the 
characters of his previous dialogues, Wilde envisions a society that needs no external sanction 
from practical, political, life. Just as art might sometimes make use of life as its rough material, 
Wilde’s theory of Socialism is a theory about the creation of the necessary conditions for 
men to become individualists. As a critic, Wilde is not interested in evidencing all the nuances 
of a political school; instead, he takes only whatever is good about it so as to fit his purpose: 
“Socialism itself will be of value simply because it will lead to individualism”; it is simply a 
means to an end and not an end in itself. That end, as we will see, is primarily artistic. Wilde’s 
socialism is the realization of a social utopia where politics would no longer interfere in any 
matters of thought and result instead in a society in which each and every one is free to reveal 
their own personality.  
Not only is Wilde interested in creating a space where no individual should ever suffer from 
economic difficulties, he is, most importantly, securing a place where individuals are free to 
realise their entire potential without expecting sanctions from the “outside”, non-utopic, 
world: “what is outside of him [man], should be a matter of no importance” (Wilde, 2002, p. 
253). In the same logic, whatever is “inside” of man, should also be a matter of no importance 
to those outside.  
What Wilde first refers to in abstract, obscure even, terms, such as man’s “potential” is later 
identified as man’s capacity to not just create but, especially, to perceive and enjoy art. If, like 
we have seen above, good art is the product of the most personal expression of an individual 
mind, it comes as no surprise, then, that Wilde identifies art as “the most intense mood of 
individualism that the world has known” (Wilde, 2002, p. 262). Art is indeed the perfect 
example of something that is done without any interference from the outside world and for 
sheer pleasure. At this point in the essay, Wilde draws an analogy between art and 
individualism, using both terms rather interchangeably. It is not exactly clear how Wilde 
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reaches this point in which the individualist and the artist are one, as, his introduction of the 
analogy is quite abrupt. It might be that, for him, this transition is only logical and to be 
expected, given that politics, for Wilde, is in itself a matter of art. If politics should aim at 
preserving the individual, and if art is the best means for an individual to realise his full 
potential, then art is directly implied in politics; aesthetics are a means to achieve the 
individual. As Julia Brown points out: 
Art’s inherent but precarious immunity from the tyrannizing of the 
spectator is synonymous with human spiritual freedom and is truly 
possible only in a society that has passed beyond socialist materialism, a 
reconstructed society no longer preaching utilitarianism, nationalism, or 
the Christian ideal of self-realization through pain. (Brown, 1997, p. 82)  
With regards to art, however, the problem in English society lies in the fact that a “badly 
brought-up” (Wilde, 2002, p. 262) public constantly tries to exercise some type of influence 
over it. Wilde criticises English audiences for trying to dominate art, and transform it into a 
utilitarian instrument of entertainment: 
They [the public] are continually asking art to be popular, to please their 
want of taste, to flatter their absurd vanity, to tell them what they have 
been told before, to show them what they ought to be tired of seeing, to 
amuse them when they feel heavy after eating too much, and to distract 
their thoughts when they are wearied of their own stupidity. (Wilde, 2002, 
p. 262) 
This is a similar situation to that which Wilde had already alluded to in “The Decay of Lying”, 
saying that, in the current situation of men’s relation to art, “life gets the upper hand and 
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drives art out into the wilderness” (Wilde, 2002, p. 152). In both cases, outside forces are 
meddling in the artistic realm in which they do not belong.  
This meddling is also partly political in the sense that a conservative public is both aware and 
afraid of art’s subversive nature. In constantly demonstrating new relations and creating new 
forms, art will necessarily break up with traditional paradigms. It is because of this 
characteristic that the uneducated public will try to tame it.  
Instead of trying to exercise their dominion over art, men should instead be receptive to it 
and allow it to exert its influence over them instead. How this change might be brought 
about is not exactly clear, but Wilde rests on a number of evolutionary references to imply 
that this process is, indeed, part of our nature: 
[individualism] comes naturally and inevitably out of man. It is the point 
to which all development tends. (...) it does not try to force people to be 
good. It knows that people are good when they are left alone. (...) When 
man has realized individualism, he will also realise sympathy and exercise 
it freely and spontaneously. (Wilde, 2002, pp. 276-277) 
Most importantly, Wilde seems to admit that there is also a moral benefit to achieving 
individualism, in the sense that it offers a way towards happiness, not only because man will 
be able to be fully in touch with his subjectivity, but (in an unexpected utilitarian twist) also 
because “sympathy with joy intensifies the sum of joy in the world” (Wilde, 2002, p. 278).  
This moral effect can, in a way, be attributed to art as well. If art is the perfect mood of one’s 
individualism, and if individualism, when achieved, will in turn cause people to “be good”, 
then it might be said that art helps people to be good. Another hint at art’s possible effect 
on morals is to be found in De Profundis, where Wilde portrays Christ as the perfect 
individualist, likening him to a true artist. Both are deeply individualistic, and in the same way 
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that Christ “sought to become eyes to be blind, ears to the deaf and a cry on the lips of those 
whose tongue had been tied” (Wilde, 2002, p. 75), so does the artist show to those who are 
so predisposed things that they might have always possessed but were oblivious of, much 
like Hamlet who gave name to the melancholy men had always felt but had never been able 
to identify.  
Here, Wilde draws close to Shelley’s remark that one of the most important characteristics 
of poetry is the fact that it shows men “new” connections between things which had never 
been perceived before. According to Shelley, such realisations can have a deep moral 
resonance in men’s minds, for: 
The great instrument of moral good is the imagination; and poetry 
administers to the effect by acting upon the cause. Poetry enlarges the 
circumference of the imagination by replenishing it with thoughts of ever 
new delight, which have the power of attracting and assimilating to their 
own nature all other thoughts, and which form new intervals and 
interstices, whose void for ever craves fresh food. (Shelley & Woodcock, 
2002, p. 642) 
Wilde admits such moral implications to be possible as well. Art is capable of creating in men 
such a state of receptivity that it might, in the end, condition the way in which they carry 
themselves, much because of life’s imitative instinct. The great moral advantage of art, then, 
would be its capacity to both create and stimulate empathy amongst men. This brings us 
back to the example of Jesus Christ, one whose influence played a vital role in Wilde’s 
maturity (as can be seen from his exaltation in De Profundis) and one whose “morality is all 
sympathy, just what morality should be” (Wilde, 2002, p. 80). Sympathy is indeed to Wilde a 
most important trait in an individualist, but it should not be exercised complacently. It has 
always been easy to sympathise with suffering, but a true individualist will be able to 
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sympathise as well with success; this Wilde found to be lacking in the men of his time, whose 
sympathy could even be regarded as egotistical: 
Up to the present man has hardly cultivated sympathy at all.  He has 
merely sympathy with pain, and sympathy with pain is not the highest 
form of sympathy. (…) It is tainted with egotism. (…) We become afraid 
that we ourselves might be as the leper or as the blind, and that no man 
would have care of us. (…) One should sympathise with the entirety of 
life, not with life’s sores and maladies merely, but with life’s joy and beauty 
and energy and health and freedom. The wider sympathy is, of course, the 
more difficult. It requires more unselfishness. Anybody can sympathise 
with the sufferings of a friend, but it requires a very fine nature—it 
requires, in fact, the nature of a true Individualist—to sympathise with a 
friend’s success. (Wilde, 2002, p. 277) 
As the perfect embodiment of individualism, Christ was also the perfect example of such a 
nature, for not only did he have sympathy for the poor, but for all. To him, all men were but 
personalities that could be developed to their fullness, despite their social condition, which 
is, of course, determined by external factors and, as thus, should not play a role in the matters 
of the spirit: 
Pity he has, of course, for the poor, (…) but he has far more pity for the 
rich, for the hard Hedonists, for those who waste their freedom in 
becoming slaves to things (Wilde, 2002, p. 74) 
Here, private property is again seen as an impediment to the development of the soul. In an 
example provided by Wilde, when Christ tells a young man to “‘sell all that thou hast and 
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give it to the poor’ it is not of the state of the poor that he is thinking but of the soul of the 
young man, the lovely soul that wealth was marring” (Wilde, 2002, p. 74). 
Contrary even, to what might be a common assumption, Wilde indicates that Christ’s creed 
was not really to live for others, but, instead, to live for ourselves. Focusing on perfecting 
our own selves would allow us to develop such a personality as would sympathise with all 
other men in return. It is necessary to look inwards before being able to look outwards. To 
Wilde, this is basically an exercise of the imagination: 
It is the imaginative quality of Christ’s own nature that makes him this 
palpitating centre of romance (Wilde, 2002, p. 77) 
This is, of course, part of Christ’s extraordinary nature, and Wilde does recognise that 
common men are not endowed with such powerful spirits, but they can nevertheless aspire 
to develop their imagination to as Christ-like a degree as possible. To Wilde, art has the 
power of helping men achieve this perfected state, for “whenever there is a romantic 
movement in Art [namely, a movement that exalted imagination over everything else], there 
somehow, and under some form, is Christ, or the soul of Christ” (Wilde, 2002, p. 77). Art 
lets us partake in men’s joys and sorrows, lets us experience the deepest suffering and the 
highest joy, it makes us “learn how salt is the bread of others and how steep their stairs” 
(Wilde, 2002, p. 74) by stimulating our imagination. These ideals, though better documented 
in De Profundis, have their germen in “The Soul of Man Under Socialism”, where this 
stimulated imagination is referred to as “the artistic temperament” (Wilde, 2002, p. 270). 
Similarly, this temperament could be developed through contacting with art, provided it is 
true in the Wildean sense of the word. Wilde found that 
There have been individual artists who have succeeded in creating in their 
audiences – and every theatre in London has its own audience – the 
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temperament to which art appeals. And what is that temperament? It is 
the temperament of receptivity. (Wilde, 2002, p. 270) 
The success of the creation of such temperament depends not only on the “individual 
artists”, but also on “their audiences”. If it is necessary that art be true, “that in which the 
outward is expressive of the inward” (Wilde, 2002, p. 76), it is also necessary that the audience 
does not try to exercise any type of authority over what they are presented with: 
He [the spectator] is to go to the play to realise an artistic temperament. 
He is to go to the play to gain an artistic temperament. He is not the arbiter 
of the work of art. He is one who is admitted to contemplate the work of 
art, and, if the work be fine, to forget in its contemplation all the egotism 
that mars him – the egotism of his ignorance, or the egotism of his 
information. (Wilde, 2002, p. 271) 
And though it may seem that Wilde is now far away from his initial political intent, one must 
not forget that such a political system as Wilde envisaged would be the basis to create in all 
men the possibility to realise themselves. Free men, who are not bound by any hard and 
degrading manual labour, are given the freedom to exercise this contemplation. This is the 
reason why Wilde’s socialism is as political as it is artistic. Politics is a means to (i) make the 
creation of art possible and (ii) to make men free to spend their lives admiring it, thus 
developing their personalities and, in turn, becoming better, more empathetic, men.  
A life of contemplation is the most commonplace objective any 19th century aesthete could 
have. To Wilde, however, the function of aestheticism and individualism can be extended to 
the perfecting not just of the individual but, consequently, of society itself, especially through 
the development of a critical faculty.  
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 In “The Critic as Artist”, Gilbert remarks that “it is through art, and through art only, that 
we can realise our perfection; through art and through art only can we shield ourselves from 
the sordid perils of actual existence” (Wilde, 2002, p. 215). 
It is through imagination, stirred by contemplation, and through the exercise of a critical 
spirit, that “we shall be able to realise, not merely our own lives, but the collective life of the 
race (…) Criticism will annihilate race-prejudices, by insisting upon the unity of the human 
mind in the variety of its forms”. If, in which regards his concept of art criticism, Wilde has 
previously corrected Matthew Arnold, in “The Soul of Man Under Socialism”, he is closer 
to his predecessor than ever. In fact, according to Julia Brown:  
In much of the standard criticism on Wilde, Pater’s influence has been 
exaggerated to the point of excluding the influences of the other 
Victorians (…) Yet Pater himself designated Wilde as Arnold’s true 
successor; he praised Intentions for carrying on ‘more perhaps than any 
other writer, the brilliant critical work of Matthew Arnold’. Like Arnold, 
Wilde understood the importance of viewing culture as a whole, as an 
integral rather than an aggregate. (Brown, 1997, p. 49) 
Like Arnold, Wilde regards art as more than simple ornament by virtue of its long-lasting 
effect on the culture of a nation because art “makes of people sentient, emotional, 
sympathetic beings whose consciousness of beauty diminishes their capacity for meanness” 
(Quintus, 1980, p. 571).  
In his journey from “The Decay of Lying” to “The Soul of Man Under Socialism” and finally, 
De Profundis, Wilde moved past the Victorian opposition of ethics versus aesthetics and 
achieved that reassociation of opposites which can be described as his very own ethical 
aesthetics (Brown, 1997, p. 51). Most of the work Wilde produced between 1889 (“The 
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Decay of Lying”) and 1891 (the revised edition of The Picture of Dorian Gray) seems to be tied 
together by a persistent search for an equilibrium between such apparently disparate 
concepts. Already in his earliest essays, Wilde envisages an ideal world in which art could 
flourish outside the tight grip of societal constraints. In his earliest, “The Decay of Lying”, 
Wilde’s dialogic counterpart Vivian prophesises a utopia in which lying is praised and 
encouraged above all else: 
And when that day dawns, or sunset reddens, how joyous we shall all be! 
Facts will be regarded as discreditable, truth will be found mourning over 
her fetters, and romance, with her temper of wonder, will return to the 
land. The very aspect of the world will change to our startled eyes. (Wilde, 
2002, p. 169) 
Again in “The Critic as Artist”, Gilbert playfully suggests that life is a failure “from the artistic 
point of view” (Wilde, 2002, p. 211) and that the only way to correct it would be to live under 
the guidance of the critic and his art as 
It is through art, and through art only, that we can realise our perfection; 
through art, and through art only that we can shield ourselves from the 
sordid perils of actual existence. (Wilde, 2002, p. 215)    
In “The Soul of Man Under Socialism”, these perils take the form of not only poverty, famine 
and ineffective sympathy with misery but also of a Philistine audience’s wish to exert 
authority over matters of thought, thus inhibiting the full development of the individualistic 
spirit, which is, as referred before, innately artistic. 
Wilde’s abstract utopianism, such as it is proposed in his essays is then self-critically put to 
test in The Picture of Dorian Gray. Though Wilde’s utopia might be said to fail in this test 
environment, as Dorian is finally confronted with and fated by the consequences of his acts, 
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Wilde’s exercise renders his aestheticism much more layered than what his many now 
celebrated aphorisms might lead one to believe. Wilde does not seem as much interested in 
completely renouncing society as he knows it as he is in showing how it can be improved 
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